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Abstract
Bell’s theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known
as “local causality” is not compatible with the predictions of quantum me-
chanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type
while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell’s theorem. How-
ever, another assumption of Bell’s theorem is the use of classical logic. One
part of this assumption is the principle of ontic definiteness, that is, that it
must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions
treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can
be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type
of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic
causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal
influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell’s
inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational
and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.
1 Introduction
Bell’s theorem [1, 2, 3] encapsulates by far the most mysterious aspect of quan-
tum mechanics, often summed up as “quantum non-locality”. Indeed, Spekkens has
put forward an ingenious, but distinctly unmysterious, hidden-variable model that
qualitatively reproduces practically every interesting feature of quantum mechanics
(interference, no-cloning, etc.) apart from nonlocality [4]. The theorem demonstrates
that a reasonable causal principle which Bell named “local causality” is incompatible
with the predictions of quantum mechanics, given some other seemingly innocuous
assumptions, chiefly “freedom of settings” from correlations with events in the past
that are relevant to the experiment, and of course the use of standard logic. As has
been noted by several authors, the assumption of local causality can be broken down
into two parts, either of which can be rejected [5, 6]. The first is the assumption that
there should be a Principle of Common Cause (PCC) [7], that is, that correlations
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between events require a causal explanation. In this view, if event A is correlated to
B, either the events are directly causally related, or the correlation can be explained
by a “common cause” C (additionally to this, a cause must be to the past of its
effect). The second is the principle of Relativistic Causal Structure (RCS), which
states that the relativistic spatiotemporal causal structure should be used to define
the past of any spacetime region, a position forced on us if we accept relativity1.
This creates a difficult choice for anyone attempting to create a satisfying interpre-
tation for quantum mechanics. At least one of Bell’s assumptions must be dropped.
Approaches such as deBroglie-Bohm pilot wave theory [8, 9] and those based on
Nelson’s mechanics [10, 11] drop the RCS assumption, whereas the GRW “spon-
taneous state-vector collapse” program [12] in Bell’s “flash” ontology [13], Kent’s
“Real Worlds” program [14] and arguably the consistent histories program [15] (to
the extent that it aims at producing a unique probability distribution of over a set of
events) all drop the PCC assumption. Suggestions have been made that the freedom
of settings assumption could be dropped instead (either in the guise of past events
influencing setting choices, or of “backwards causation”) [16, 17].
These considerations lead us to the first main argument of this paper. Bell’s
theorem creates the great conceptual difficulties it does for the following reason: it
seems to preclude the possibility of recovering a satisfying causal principle in any
theory that contains quantum mechanics. Each of the options currently on the table
leaves something to be desired in this regard, as discussed at greater length below.
This issue is distinct from the measurement problem. Leaving the measurement
problem unsolved simply begs the question, as we will see, and is, at bottom, a
particular way of dropping the PCC as an assumption. Below, it is maintained that
a satisfying causal principle, given what we know of physics, should be relativistic.
This at least means that it should ban superluminal signalling. As we will see,
without any one of the three assumptions mentioned above, this cannot be achieved,
and so the lack of superluminal signalling remains unexplained by a causal principle in
interpretations which drop one of these – which is distinctly unsatisfying. However,
a satisfying causal principle needs to be more than simply a ban on superluminal
signalling, for reasons that are also addressed. Local causality, or its deterministic
cousin, Einstein locality, are better examples of satisfying causal conditions.
Why should we want to reinstate such a causal principle at all? The reasons for
this are treated at greater length in an appendix to this article. The most basic reason
is that doing so may enhance our understanding of present theory, and increase the-
oretical progress. Also, if a relativistic version of the PCC could be made compatible
with quantum mechanics, it would be a restrictive condition on theories. This could
serve as a guiding principle in the search for new theories. For example, this idea has
already been applied in the context of the causal set approach to quantum gravity,
at least in a classical setting. In this case, a stochastic toy model was developed by
taking a general dynamical framework and then selecting a physically appealing set
1Thus, it is not accurate to say that Bell’s theorem shows a contradiction between a realis-
tic world-view and relativity (given the other assumptions); the two can be made compatible by
dropping the PCC, just as they are in operational interpretations [6].
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of dynamics by applying basic physical principles, including a causal principle [18].
The one path left to us is the alteration of logic. Curiously, although the use
of nonstandard logics has often been considered in the study of the foundations of
quantum mechanics, this has never been motivated by the possibility of evading
Bell’s theorem. Before the problem of Bell’s theorem became apparent, Birkhoff
and von Neumann attempted to consistently incorporate all projection operators as
propositions in one “quantum logic” [19, 20], while Reichenbach’s three-valued logic
approach [21] sought first and foremost to give meaning to complimentary statements,
and to complementarity itself, inside the logic being employed, rather than declaring
some statements meaningless (although he did come close to some aspects of the
discussion below in his treatment of EPR “causal anomalies”). Most recently, topos
theory has been used to incorporate contextuality in a pseudo-realist setting [22, 23],
whist anhomomophic logic was introduced to deal with interference in an observer-
independent sum-over-histories account of quantum theory [24, 25, 26].
Altering logic to evade Bell’s theorem seems at first like a very drastic and unnatu-
ral step to take, which could only be motivated by desperation to avoid the difficulties
of other approaches. Several questions immediately arise. Firstly, our causal princi-
ple of local causality, and freedom of settings, are built on the foundation of normal
logic. At first glance, then, it seems that we would have to reject local causality with
any attempt to alter logic – a case of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
Proposing a different causal principle in a different logical setting may, therefore,
seem therefore like nothing more than an arbitrary proposal that could have been
designed to reach the desired conclusion, rather like moving the goalposts in order to
score. Also, several related worries may arise about the connection to the everyday
world of standard logic. Can causation itself be given a satisfying meaning in any
particular logical framework? And, when reasoning about the new logical system, are
we not applying classical logic in any case? The justifications for, and ramifications
of, taking so radical a step should be considered carefully.
We will see that these concerns can be answered in at least one case of altered
logic. First, a third “intermediate” truth value is added between true and false.
This can be done without changing anything in the standard picture, if we treat the
indefinite truth value as signifying ignorance of the “real”, definite, truth value. The
break with standard logic comes when we question whether there need be a definite
truth value for all propositions in all circumstances. A principle along these lines
is dubbed ontic definiteness below. As we will see, rejecting this assumption does
no damage at all to the definition or meaning of Einstein locality or the freedom
of settings; together they still ban superluminal signalling, for instance. Even so,
this move does allow us to evade Bell’s theorem. Dropping ontic definiteness thus
allows us to preserve a satisfying causal principle without running into a contradiction
with the predictions of quantum mechanics. Rather than being a desperate measure
forced on us by Bell’s theorem, it is arguable that this innovation would have been
welcomed by many philosophers and mathematicians independently of the problem
of Bell’s theorem. Besides this – whether or not this should affect our judgements – it
is not as far from common sense as many “quantum logics” that have been proposed.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, a framework is given in which
a relativistic causal principle can be defined, as an example of what is being searched
for. Section 3 discusses the consequences of dropping assumptions of Bell’s theorem
for this type of principle. In section 4, the assumption of standard logic is addressed,
and the assumption of ontic definiteness is defined, leading to a discussion of how
quantum correlations in the EPRB experiment may be given a causal explanation. A
discussion of the consequences of this view, and further possible objections, is given in
section 5. The appendices deal with justifications for insisting on a satisfying causal
principle (appendix A), relations between various causal principles (appendix B), and
a comparison to Reichenbach’s three-valued logic (appendix C).
2 A Causal Principle
Before explaining anything further about maintaining a satisfying causal principle
when faced with Bell’s theorem, it is worthwhile to consider why we would want
to do so. Since it is somewhat outside the main topic of the article, comments on
this topic are relegated to Appendix A. All that is necessary here is to make the
following modest assertion: finding a satisfying causal principle that is compatible
with quantum theory may help us to make scientific progress. The intuition behind
this will be clarified in the process of defining a causal principle and examining the
issue in the context of Bell’s theorem.
The next question is: what exactly is meant by a satisfying causal principle? We
can now turn to a discussion of a good example2.
2.1 Einstein locality
Let us first consider a deterministic, relativistic principle of causality, Einstein Local-
ity (a term apparently introduced by Bell and d’Espagnat [30]). Discussion will be
limited, for the remainder of this article, to theories with fixed background spacetime.
EL is a restriction on non-probabilistic theories, which we can define in the following
way. First, we consider a space of histories Ω. Each history is supposed to represent
a full specification of all physical properties of the system being modelled at all times.
Events are subsets of Ω. The word “event” here is taken to mean something that may
or may not occur according to the theory, i.e. events correspond to propositions in
the theory, and the subset of Ω is the set of histories for which the proposition is true.
There is a Boolean algebra of events Σ, which contains all the events that we can ask
about in this theory3. This simply means that for questions about pairs of events,
2It is worth noting here that, despite some discussion, expressions of the type put forward by
Reichenbach and Bell have been convincingly defended from various claims that principles of common
cause might reasonably be made significantly weaker [5, 27, 28, 29]. See also the comments at the
end of the following section.
3For the purposes of this article it will be convenient to ignore the complications that arise for
history spaces with uncountable cardinality, in which case the algebra should more properly be a
Boolean sigma-algebra.
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logical operations are defined in the normal way. Each history γ ∈ Ω corresponds to
a truth valuation on this algebra, technically a homomorphism γ : Σ→ {0, 1}, where
{0, 1} is the two element Boolean algebra. Here, 0 is taken to mean “false” and 1
“true”. For instance, event A might signify that there is a ball in a particular box,
and if γ(A) = 1, that would be true for the history γ. That γ( ·) is a homomorphism
means that the usual rules of logic apply to the truth values, for instance, if “A” is
false then “not A” must be true. We will use set theoretic notation so that A ∩ B
means, in words, “A and B”, Ac (the set complement) means “not A”, and so on.
We also need to introduce the background spacetime, which we call M. For our
purposes this M can be defined as a weakly causal Lorentzian manifold4 (although
the formalism could be just as easily applied to a discrete causal set). To say that
our spacetime is equipped with a spatiotemporal causal structure means that there
is a partial order ≺ on its points, where x ≺ y signifies that point x is to the past
of point y. We call subsets of the spacetime “regions”. For a region R ⊂ M, the
“causal past” J−(R) is defined to be all those points that are to the past of (or equal
to) any point in R.
Each event occurs somewhere in our fixed background spacetime. Thus, we define
a map between regions and subalgebras of Σ, ∆ : pow(M)→ pow(Σ), where pow(M)
is the set of all subsets ofM and pow(Σ) is the set of all subalgebras of Σ. That is, to
each region R we assign a a Boolean subalgebra of Σ, which we label Σ|R, and we say
that an event A ∈ Σ|R is associated to the region R. This amounts to saying that, if a
set of events is associated to a region, then logical combinations of those events should
also be associated to that region. These “regions of association” must obey certain
consistency conditions which we need not go into in detail here (the reader is referred
to [29]). It will suffice to say that if R ⊂ R′ then Σ|R is a subalgebra of Σ|R′ . Truth
valuations can be restricted to any subalgebra in the obvious way, and we will denote
the restriction of γ( ·) to the subalgebra associated to R as γ|R : Σ|R → {0, 1}. The
collection of all such restrictions γ|R of truth valuations corresponding to histories
γ ∈ Ω will be called Ω|R.
A non-probabilistic theory on the history space also provides a subset Θ ⊂ Ω that
contains the histories allowed by the theory. For instance, if Ω was the set of scalar
field configurations φ(x), Θ might contain only the solutions to a particular field
equation. We can imagine the theory as a pack of cards, each representing a history
in Θ. If, by experiment and observation, we know the truth values of a certain set of
events, we can go through the deck, keeping the cards that agree with our knowledge
and throwing the rest away (events whose truth values we don’t know are allowed to
be true or false on the cards that we keep). If we have no cards left, our theory has
been falsified. Otherwise, we can use the remaining cards to make inferences about
other events (including predictions), if they have the same truth value on all of those
cards.
We will call two events “correlated” (resp. “anticorrelated”) if and only if they
share the same truth value (resp. have opposite truth values) for all histories in Θ.
4This is a differentiable manifold equipped with a Lorentzian metric that admits no closed causal
curves, allowing a well-defined causal relation between all pairs of points.
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Another way to state this is that A and B are correlated if and only if A∩Θ = B∩Θ.
We will say that A is weakly correlated to B if and only if A ∩ Θ ⊂ B ∩ Θ, so that
γ(A) = 1 implies that γ(B) = 1 for all histories in Θ. Weak correlation includes the
case of full correlation. Finally, if we want to discuss probabilities for events, we can
put a probability distribution on Ω that only has support in Θ.
Figure 1: A “spacetime diagram” of the regions involved in the definition of Einstein
Locality (hereM is represented as 2D Minkowski space in a usual spacetime diagram, with
time running up the page). The region R is the union of the unshaded region X and the
shaded past region P = J−(X )\X within (and including) the light-cone. According to EL,
the truth values of events in P must determine the truth values of all events in R.
We now have enough machinery in place to define Einstein Locality. Consider a
region X , its past R = J−(X ) and its “exclusive past” P = J−(X )\X where \ is set
difference, as shown in figure 1. The idea is that what happens in R is determined
by what happens in P5. So, if we fix the truth value of every event that occurs in P,
then this should fix all truth values in R.
Einstein locality: Consider a nonprobabilistic theory defined by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆},
and regions X , R = J−(X ) and P = J−(X )\X . The theory is Einstein Local if the
following condition holds for all regions X :
∀γ∗P ∈ Ω|P , ∃γ
∗
R ∈ Ω|R such that ∀γ ∈ Θ, if γ|P = γ
∗
P then γ|R = γ
∗
R.
That is, if only we knew everything about events in P, we could infer the truth
value of all events in R. That is what is meant by events in P determining events
in R. To explain this principle let us return to the analogy of the deck of cards.
We wish to keep in our hand only those cards that are possible histories. Einstein
Locality says that, if we condition on all events associated with the past region P, so
that we only hold cards with a particular set of truths values for these (called γ∗P),
then we will find that, for all events in R, the same truth values (given by γ∗R) will
be given on every remaining card.
There is another way of stating Einstein Locality:
5The reason that we use the region R rather than X is to make our condition sound even if we
allow that some events associated with R may not be logical combinations of events associated with
X and events associated with P . This type of condition is known as “separability of events”, and is
called property (iv) in [29].
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Einstein Locality (second formulation): Consider a nonprobabilistic theory
defined by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, and regions X , R = J−(X ) and P = J−(X )\X . The
theory is Einstein Local if the following condition holds for all regions X :
∀A ∈ Σ|R, ∃B ∈ Σ|P such that γ(A) = γ(B) ∀γ ∈ Θ.
In words, this means that for all events associated to R there is an event associated
to P that is correlated to (or “determines”) it. The determining past event B will
sometimes be termed the causal antecedent of A below. The proof that these two
definitions are equivalent is relegated to appendix B.1.
This condition has a close link to Reichenbachian principles of common cause
[7, 29]. Einstein locality encapsulates a nonprobabilistic PCC (NPCC). The following
is a “joint past” version of this principle:
NPCCj: Consider a nonprobabilistic theory defined by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, two space-
like regions A and B, and their “joint past” Pj = J
−(A) ∪ J−(B)\(A ∪ B) as shown
in figure 2. The theory obeys the NPCCj if the following principle holds: for any pair
of events A ∈ Σ|A and B ∈ Σ|B, if A and B are correlated, then there exists an event
C ∈ Σ|Pj that is correlated to both B and C.
This follows from the second formulation of Einstein locality: that principle requires
that event there is an event C in the past (that is, associated to J−(A), which is a
subset of the joint past Pj) such that γ(A) = γ(C) ∀γ ∈ Θ, and if γ(A) = γ(B)
∀γ ∈ Θ, then C is also correlated to B. By considering the complement of events
we can easily extend this reasoning to anticorrelated events as well. There is also a
“mutual past” version of this principle:
NPCCm: Consider a nonprobabilistic theory defined by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, two space-
like regions A and B, and their “mutual past” Pm = J
−(A) ∩ J−(B) as shown in
figure 2. The theory obeys NPCCm if the following principle holds: for any pair of
events A ∈ Σ|A and B ∈ Σ|B, if A and B are correlated, then there exists an event
C ∈ Σ|Pm that is correlated to both B and C.
These two versions on the NPCC are in fact equivalent, as is proven in appendix
B.2. Thus, both of them follow from Einstein Locality.
What is the relation between Einstein Locality and other causal principles? In the
case of a non-relativistic theory, instead of a relativistic spatiotemporal causal struc-
ture, we simply put all events that are associated to spacetime regions before time t
to the past of all events that are associated to regions after or at that time. Above,
substituting the relativistic causal structure of our Lorentzian manifold M with this
kind of causal structure would give the kind of determinism found in Newtonian
theories (sometimes called Millsian causation [31]).
One might wonder if it is necessary to have strict determinism to have a good
causal principle that incorporates the PCC and bans superluminal influence. Indeed,
for this purpose is not necessary to have everything in R determined by events in
7
Figure 2: A “spacetime diagram” of the regions involved in the definition of the Nonprob-
abilistic Principle of Common Cause (joint past version). The spacelike regions A and B
are shown unshaded, while Pj = J
−(A)∪J−(B)\(A∪B) is the entire shaed region between
(and including) both lightcones. According this PCC, any correlated pairs of events in
regions A and B must be correlated to a further event in Pj .
P, but only necessary that, once we have conditioned on all events in P, nothing
more about the truth values of event in R can be determined by conditioning on any
events that occur spacelike to R. This line of argument leads to a weaker condition.
However (and although giving a thorough defence of this would require a separate
article), I claim that (a) this weakening does not evade Bell’s theorem and (b) we will
be able to maintain the stronger condition of Einstein locality when we alter logic.
Because of this, the weaker condition is not relevant for the following discussion.
Beyond this, there are the probabilistic formulations such as Bell’s local causality.
It is not hard to convince oneself that these follow from Einstein locality in the
following sense. If we take the histories in Θ and put a probability distribution
over them, then, if the original theory was Einstein local, the resulting probabilities
theory will obey a version of local causality called SO2 in [29]. This derivation is
left for appendix B.3. Again, it is well known that using the probabilistic version
does not evade Bell’s theorem. There are several other formulations of probabilistic,
relativistic causal principles, but in previous work it was conjectured that all of
these are either problematic, equivalent to local causality, or incorporate additional
inessential assumptions [29], and steps have been taken towards showing this (see
also [27]). The conclusion, again, is that Einstein locality is a reasonable condition
to concentrate on for the purposes outlined in the introduction of this article. The
important thing to keep in mind is that Einstein locality expresses the principle that
there are no superluminal influences, as all events are determined by events in their
past light-cone. It encompasses a combination of a principle of common cause, and
relativistic causal structure. In particular, when the theory describes agents and
devices, Einstein locality bans superluminal signalling.
2.2 Einstein locality and superluminal signalling
As explained in appendix A.2, a distinction needs to be drawn between a simple
operational ban on superluminal signalling, and causal conditions like EL which ban
superluminal influence. Nonetheless, since signalling is a type of influence, any rela-
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tivistic causal condition worth its salt should imply a ban on superluminal signalling.
Fortunately it is not hard to see that EL does this.
We can now give a straightforward account of how Einstein locality gives rise to a
ban on superluminal signalling. Consider an agent in a region A trying to influence
something in a spacelike region B. Some event A ∈ Σ|A is to be regarded as the input
event, and some event B ∈ Σ|B will be the output. In the context of non-probabilistic
theories set out above, we can distinguish strong and weak signalling. Let us consider
strong signals first. A strong signal is successful if and only if A and B are correlated,
which as before means that γ(A) = γ(B) ∀ γ ∈ Θ. This is not sufficient to define
signalling, however. For example, if two newspapers delivered to two different houses
have the same headline, this does not constitute a signal between the newspapers.
Both events were determined by a common cause in the past. Thus we must impose
some condition to make sure that event A is a “free setting”: that is, A is free from
the influence of past events that may also influence B. One requirement is that, in
our model, A is not determined by any event in its past region J−(A)\A. If we
are applying EL, we must in this case exempt the event A from being determined,
basically because we have left out its causal antecedents from our model. For instance,
we might decide A based on what we had for breakfast. “Freedom of settings” means
assuming that what we had for breakfast, or any other such factor, is irrelevant when
modelling the system in question. The event B however is not free. With A “free”
in this sense, if γ(A) = γ(B) ∀ γ ∈ Θ, then we must admit that there is superluminal
signalling from A to B.
It can now be seen that this can be ruled out by applying EL. Consider the region
Z = J−(B)\J−(A). Because B ⊂ Z, it follows that B ∈ Σ|Z , and so by Einstein
Locality B requires a causal antecedent in J−(Z) = J−(A) ∩ J−(B), that is, an
event C such that γ(B) = γ(C) ∀ γ ∈ Θ. But if γ(A) = γ(B) ∀ γ ∈ Θ this implies
γ(A) = γ(C) ∀ γ ∈ Θ which contradicts our freedom of settings assumption for A,
because C is associated to J−(A) ∩ J−(B) and thus is associated to the past of A 6.
Weak signalling means that the truth value of the signal can affect the value of
the output, but does not in all circumstances. There is a weak signal between A and
B if and only if A is a free setting, and B is weakly correlated to A. In this case,
γ(B) = 0 whenever γ(A) = 0 for all histories in Θ, and so the truth value of A can
determine the truth value of B, although the events may not be fully correlated in
the sense already defined. Changing the setting could thus affect the truth value of
the event B. The definition could just as easily have been that A is weakly correlated
to B (rather than B to A), but this is a matter of convention if Ac is also regarded
as a signal, which it will be.
This line of thought also shows that our condition for an event like A to be a free
setting is incomplete: we do not want any event C in J−(A)\A to be even weakly
6This conclusion might seem surprising: why cannot the chain of causal antecedents of B remain
outside of the past of A arbitrarily far into the past, or until some initial cosmological hypersurface?
Such a scenario would imply that the setting event was correlated to some initial cosmological event
outside its past light-cone, or events arbitrarily far in the past, however, and it is reasonable that
freedom of settings and EL together ban this. A similar argument is dealt with in appendix B.2
(see [29] for more on this point).
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correlated to A. If it were, γ(A) = 1 is forced on us if we have γ(C) = 1, and so A
can hardly be described as free from influence from its past. Again, Einstein Locality
ensures that there can be no superluminal signalling, even of this weak variety. We
previously established that, if EL holds, there is an event C associated to the past
of A that is correlated to B. If B is weakly correlated to A, then C must also be
weakly correlated to A, violating our strengthened freedom of settings condition.
In the probabilistic setting, freedom of settings again means that the setting A
should not be probabilistically correlated to any event in the past region (and neither
should it become so after we condition on any other event in the past). Here we are
using the word correlation in the usual probabilistic sense. This is the assumption
that goes into Bell’s theorem.
3 Dropping assumptions of Bell’s theorem
Having discussed an example of a satisfying causal principle, we now examine the ef-
fects on the maintenance of such a principle if we drop assumptions of Bell’s theorem.
3.1 Dropping counterfactual definiteness?
It has been claimed by some that, as well as local causality, Bell’s theorem depends on
a certain “hidden-variables” assumption. Thus those who object to the lack of local
causality in Quantum Mechanics suggested by Bell’s theorem, it it argued, need only
reject the idea of hidden variables. This view is summed up by Mermin [32] when
he says “to those for whom nonlocality is anathema, Bells Theorem finally spells the
death of the hidden-variables program.”
For simplicity let us consider measurements with outcome valued in {0, 1} (i.e.mea-
surements corresponding to single events). Counterfactual definiteness asserts that,
for every possible measurement, there must be an event (occurring in the same region
as the measurement) that shares the truth value that would have been obtained if
that measurement was performed, irrespective of whether the measurement actually
was performed. This is sometimes cited as an assumption of Bell’s theorem, leading
to conclusions like Mermin’s. One interpretation of the sentence quoted above is
that there is a choice between locality and counterfactual definiteness, and that, in
operational interpretations in particular, we can have a satisfactory resolution to the
problem of Bell’s theorem if we drop counterfactual definiteness.
This interpretation is mistaken, however. Norsen (quoting other earlier treat-
ments) convincingly argues that counterfactual definiteness is not a separate assump-
tion, but in fact follows from local causality (and the results of quantum mechanics
which specify that perfect correlations between some outcome events can be achieved
in the EPRB set-up) [33]. Indeed, it is clear in Bell’s last published account of his
result [3] that the argument begins with causality and leads to counterfactual defi-
niteness. Thus, whether or not we start with a bias on the subject of hidden variables,
if we accept Bell’s local causality as a good formalisation of the idea of a relativistic
causal principle, then we are forced to accept counterfactual definiteness. In other
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words, when standard logic is assumed, rejecting counterfactual definiteness amounts
to rejecting local causality (and Einstein Locality).
The lack of superluminal signalling is often mentioned in the operational context,
to justify quantum theory against the principle of relativity. Be that as it may, lack
of superluminal signalling cannot be substituted for local causality; it is not in itself
a good relativistic causal principle of the type being searched for here, as argued in
appendix A.2. The problem of quantum nonlocality still remains. Thus, “to those
for whom nonlocality is anathema”, all of the options presently on the table should
be equally unsatisfying.
The conclusion is that there is no separate assumption of Bell’s theorem here.
Despite this, later we will see that there is a way to resurrect the counterfactual
definiteness “loophole” while maintaining Einstein Locality. This is made possible by
dropping another, deeper assumption.
3.2 Dropping the PCC
Dropping the principle of common cause itself clearly amounts to throwing in the
towel as far as maintaining a causal principle is concerned. In this approach, there
are still prospects for doing away with measurement as a fundamental notion in
quantum mechanics, but one gives up on another goal of quantum interpretation:
that of inferring facts about the quantum world using a causal principle, as briefly
argued in appendix A. In interpretations like Kent’s Real Worlds [14], and consistent
histories [15](in one reading), the goal is to extract from the quantum formalism
some probability distribution on a coarse-grained algebra of events, which should at
least be larger than any set of questions that we could ever answer operationally.
But confronted with the strange correlations of the EPRB experiment, one simply
claims that correlations do not need to be explained. Although the production of
the original Bell state in the past of both wings of the experiment seems to be the
“cause” in some sense, this has not been formalised. But how, in this view, do we
explain the lack of superluminal signalling in relativistic quantum theories? It can
have nothing to do with a deeper lack of superluminal influence, talk of which we
have forsworn; it is merely an unexplained fact. GRW “state-vector-collapse” models
[12], most clearly in Bell’s flash ontology [13], have the same feature.
Operational treatments of quantum mechanics should also be put in this cate-
gory. In this case the events that we allow in our theory are only those in some set
of “operational” events, referring explicitly to preparations and observations. But
nothing stops us from conceiving of such theories as probability distributions over
this rather impoverished algebra of events (albeit that the set of events is not given
by the theory, but defined by fiat, due to the arbitrary split between the classical
and quantum worlds), which can as above be located in spacetime regions. Again,
we find that the PCC is not respected; correlations between spacelike events cannot
always be explained by conditioning on past events. As Norsen has noted, then, there
is something wrong with the assertion that the assumptions of Bell’s theorem can be
summed up as “local realism”, as if there is a separate assumption of realism involved,
the rejection of which relieves us of the conundurum of Bell’s theorem [34]. Rather,
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operationalist accounts also have to drop the assumption of the PCC, and thus give
just as bad an account of causality as some of the so-called “realist” alternatives.
I will also claim that many-worlds interpretations should be placed in this category
and thus fail to maintain a satisfying causal principle. The point has been made by
Timpson and Brown [6] that the PCC has to be dropped in this case for consistency
with relativity7.
3.3 Dropping RCS
Instead we can insist on the PCC, and freedom of settings, but reject relativistic causal
structure. In doing so we can at least maintain a non-relativistic, “Millsian” version
of causation as in Newtonian theories. This is the position taken in deBroglie-Bohm
pilot wave theories [8, 9], or in reworkings [11] of Nelson’s “stochastic mechanics”
programme [10], for example. In this view, the lack of superluminal signalling is
merely a peculiarity of the theory, which is not related to any objective lack of
superluminal influence. Likewise the apparent relativistic nature of events at the
classical level is just an emergent peculiarity that is not reflected in the fundamental
theory.
The following discussion will be based on the position that this does not add up
to a satisfying causal principle. We have added extra events to quantum mechanics in
order to satisfy the PCC. But we do not find an ontology that agrees with important
physical principles like those of relativity. Neither do we recover a causal principle that
explains the lack of superluminal signalling. Instead, we end up with experimentally
inaccessible events that violate relativity and allow superluminal influences. It is a
reasonable (though not inescapable) conclusion that something has gone wrong: “to
those for whom nonlocality is anathema”, these hypothetical new events provide an
unlikely explanation of apparent events, and so are not telling us anything useful.
The new underlying variables seem to be a “fifth wheel” in the theory.
3.4 Dropping Freedom of Settings
This leaves the possibility of dropping the “freedom of settings” assumption. This
seems to provide us with a way to keep both a causal principle and relativity in
the face of Bell’s theorem. Given the “apparent” events (settings and outcomes)
described by Bell, we can “fine-grain” the description, adding hypothetical events
to the past in order to find a model that contains the apparent events, but which
also obeys local causality. The problem with this approach is that any probability
distribution over events happening in spacetime can be “causally completed” in this
way. This follows from a theorem of Placek’s [35]8. This includes even the most
7However,the following discussion in [6] attempts to give a causal account of the EPRB experi-
ment in the many-worlds setting in a different way. These ideas seem to me inadequate to recover
a satisfying causal principle in the sense that it is being searched for here, however. Discussion of
these subtleties will be left for future work.
8The theorem does not consider the issue of where in spacetime events occur in the same way
as has been done in the present work, but this issue can easily be dealt with by putting the added
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blatant cases of superluminal signalling. For example, as in the discussion of section
2.2, our agent could be controlling a “setting” event A in a region A spacelike to
region B, containing event B. Let us say that the events are perfectly correlated.
Without the freedom of settings requirement, we can make a causal model of this
simply by adding an event C in the past that is perfectly correlated with A and B.
Perhaps C could describe some event involving the decay of a “conspiriton” particle,
one half of which travels off to determine B whilst the other half goes off to determine
the agent’s decision on what value of A to choose – and also anything correlated to
her decision, for instance what she had for breakfast, if she chooses the setting on
that basis.
Without any further restriction, the proposed relativistic causal principle is com-
pletely empty. In particular, it allows superluminal signalling. In this case it is not
deserving of the name; it is not a satisfying relativistic causal principle. It is possible
that, if we first imposed other conditions on our theory, local causality could regain
some power, but then the problem would be justifying calling this set of conditions a
causal principle. As well as banning superluminal signalling, a causal principle should
be justifiable on counterfactual grounds. Although none of these considerations rule
out making an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on this loophole, they do
critically undermine motivation for doing so rather than pursuing other methods9.
As we have seen, whether or not to solve the measurement problem is only one
of the major decisions that must be made when interpreting quantum mechanics. A
second, perhaps equally important choice, is which assumption of Bell’s theorem to
sacrifice. The most well-known interpretations all choose to drop either the PCC or
relativistic causal structure. Explicitly or implicitly, this choice depends on whether
or not we feel that the principle of common cause is so important to physics that it
must be preserved, even at the expense of relativity. We have also seen that dropping
any of the three assumptions that are most usually discussed leads to an unsatisfying
situation regarding relativistic causal principles. The question now is, can we do
better by exploiting the forth assumption, that of standard logic?
4 A modest alteration in logic
4.1 Possible objections
There are (at least) four objections that may cause some reticence to alter logic when
faced with the problem of Bell’s theorem. Objection (1), “throwing the baby out
“hypothetical” events into the past of all of the original “apparent” events.
9Two other “loopholes” should be mentioned at this point. The first is that commented on by
Morgan: that Bell correlations could be explained if we allow “initial correlations”, i.e. correlations
between event on some initial spacelike surface before the experiment, or correlations that somehow
propagate in from past infinity [17]. This is technically distinct from freedom of settings, but
the arguments against exploiting it are very similar. Secondly there is “backwards causation”, as
exploited in Cramer’s transactional interpretation [16], which can be seen as a different gloss on the
rejection of freedom of settings from correlations with past events, and fails to maintain a satisfying
causal principle for the same reason.
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with the bathwater”, is that all the other assumptions of Bell’s theorem are premised
on standard logic, and so it would seem that rejecting logic does not allow us to save
them. In answer to this, we will see below that one particular part of normal logic can
be removed without doing any damage to a particular formulation of Einstein locality.
Objection (2), “moving the goalposts”, is similar, but directed at the motivation for
the causal principle after logic has been altered. The argument is that the whole
idea of causality depends on standard logic, and anything that might be called a
causal principle in a non-standard logical setting is in fact an arbitrary invention. To
combat this, in the details below it will be shown that such a principle can indeed
be satisfying in the sense of banning superluminal influences (including signalling)
and having a counterfactual motivation that is practically identical to that of Einstein
Locality in the case of standard logic, giving it every bit as much meaning. Objection
(3), “common sense”, is that logic should not be altered on empirical grounds (for
debate on this point see [36, 37]); since it applies to the way we reason at all times –
even while considering altering logic – and to everyday events, standard logic simply
cannot be rejected. Hopefully, the modest alteration prosed below will not draw so
much criticism in this regard, for the following reasons. Firstly, similar things have
been proposed outside of the present context, and secondly, the usual reasoning for
everyday or scientific purposes is not threatened. Objection (4), “the meta-level”
objection, is that even if we had a physical theory based on non-standard logic, we
would still have to reason about it using standard logic. Would it not always be
possible to reduce the theory to one based on standard logic, and in that case, are we
not stuck with the choice between the original three assumptions of Bell’s theorem?
The details of this objection, and the answer to it, are somewhat more involved, and
so discussion of this point will be deferred until we have an example to work with.
Standard logic (which we are applying to events in spacetime) consists of the
Boolean algebra of events Σ, the standard space of truth valuations {0, 1} and the
standard type of truth valuations or “histories” γ, which are homomorphisms. Below,
the Boolean algebra of events will be kept, but the space of truth valuations will be
replaced with {0, 1/2, 1}. Reichenbach also considered such a move as a response to
quantum mechanics [21]; the approach here differs significantly from his, as explained
in Appendix C. The three truth values will first be introduced in a way that does no
injury to standard ideas of logic10.
4.2 Introducing the intermediate truth value: “a theory of
local knowables”
The Boolean algebra Σ of events has already been introduced, along with the idea
of a truth valuation or history γ : Σ −→ {0, 1}, and the history space Ω. The
histories γ represent possible realities here; we can talk as if one history is the one
that actually exists, independent of our knowledge of the truth values of the various
events. Histories like this can been termed ontic [4]. But what if we don’t know some
10The approach taken here could be called a simple type of “epistemic logic” [38], and also turns
out to have similarities to Rescher and Brandom’s “schematic worlds” [39].
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of the truth values? To put it another way, we might know that the ontic history
lies in a certain subset of Ω, but have no knowledge about it beyond that. This gives
rise to the idea of an epistemic history, which describes the state of knowledge rather
than the most detailed possible description of the history. An easy way to describe
an epistemic history is by a subset of Ω. But we can also describe it as a new kind
of truth valuation on the algebra of events Σ. Here we need the extra truth value
1/2, which we will call “intermediate” 11. “Three-valued truth valuations” will be
truth valuations using the three values. For the purpose of this section (that is, to
motivate the new logic), the term “three-valued” can be replaced with “epistemic”,
and “intermediate” with “unknown”, without disturbing the meaning. These three-
valued truth valuations can be derived from a set of ontic histories in the following
way.
The rule for deriving a three-valued truth valuation γ˜X from a set of ontic histories
X is as follows: if there exists some t ∈ {0, 1} for which γ(A) = t ∀ γ ∈ X , then
γ˜X(A) = t, otherwise γ˜X(A) = 1/2. An equivalent way of saying this is that γ˜X(A) =
1 if and only if A ⊃ X , γ˜X(A) = 0 if and only if A
c ⊃ X , and γ˜X(A) = 1/2
otherwise. This is exactly the intuitive rule: if we know the history is in some set
for which our proposition is always true (resp. false), then the proposition must be
true (resp. false); if, on the other hand, all we know is that the history is in some set
for which our proposition can be true or false, then we don’t know its actual truth
value. We will say that γ˜X is the three-valued truth valuation derived from the set
X . Note that X is itself an event, and the events that are true for γ˜X are those
that are logically implied by X . Note also that the first formulation of “deriving a
three-valued truth valuation” given here can also be applied to a set of three-valued
truth valuations, rather than ontic ones. This can be used to further coarse-grain the
state of knowledge.
Figure 3: A Venn diagram depicting a history space Ω. Each point in the space represents
an “ontic” history γ ∈ Ω, and the subset Θ represents all histories allowed by our theory,
as explained in section 2.1. A three-valued truth valuation γ˜X can be derived from the set
X as explained in the text. It can be imagined that it is only known that the “real” history
is in the set X. In the case shown, γ˜X(A) = 1 because γ(A) = 1 for all γ ∈ X. In contrast,
γ˜X(B) = 1/2 and γ˜X(C) = 0.
11This term is meant to be considered philosophically neutral, rather than implying an “onto-
logically distinct” third truth value (which we will term “indefinite”) or a merely epistemic notion
(which we will term “unknown”).
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What is the logic that applies to this new kind of truth valuation? For definite
truth values (meaning 0 and 1), standard truth tables apply. For intermediate values,
there is not always a unique output for a logical operation. For instance, consider
the operation “and”. If γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) = 1/2, then γ˜(A ∩ B) can equal 1/2 or 0. It
cannot equal 1 as this would imply that both A and B must have the definite value
1. It is possible to set γ˜(A ∩ B) = 0 however since this does not fix the ontic truth
value of either A or B. This logic will not be examined in detail here; it is a sufficient
definition that all three-valued truth valuations can be derived from a subset of some
ontic history space Ω in the above sense.
What is a theory now? In the standard case, it was described by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}.
Each member of Ω is a history γ with an associated two-valued truth valuation γ( ·).
In the three-valued case this suggests {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆}, where Ω˜ is the space of all
subsets of Ω, each of which has an associated three-valued truth valuation, and Θ˜
is the subset of these that are also subsets of Θ. That is, if our three-valued theory
is merely to be the epistemic version of the theory {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, then Θ˜ should
just be the set of all three-valued truth valuations that can be derived from subsets
of Θ. In this case we will say that Θ˜ has been derived from Θ. When Θ˜ is derived
in this way, our ontic theory tells us that the “real” history is in the set Θ, and
the histories allowed in our three-valued theory just express ignorance about which
one it is. Epistemic theories {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆} derived in this way from ontic theories
therefore obey the following principle12:
Ontic definiteness: A three-valued theory {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆} obeys the principle of
ontic definiteness if and only if there exists some subset Θ of the ontic history space
Ω from which Ω˜ is derived, such that Θ ⊂ Θ˜ and all of the indefinite truth valuations
in Θ˜ can be derived from subsets of Θ.
In this way we can derive a three-valued theory from any ontic theory, simply by
allowing for the truth values of some events to be unknown. In the card analogy, we
now have a larger deck of cards, each one of which represents a truth valuation in
Θ˜. If we know the truth values of some events, we can again take all the cards that
agree with them and throw the rest away. As before we can use the remaining cards
to make predictions and draw inferences. In this case, there will be a unique card in
our remaining hand, the “actual epistemic truth valuation”, on which all events with
unknown truth values have truth value 1/2. But also, there will be many other cards
representing other three-valued truth valuations which could become applicable when
we come to know more. Amongst these, because of ontic definiteness, our hand will
always include at least one of our original set of cards, the ontic histories.
12It is tempting to simply name this condition “realism”. This would chime somewhat with
the usage in philosophy, especially the work of Dummett [40]. However, this word has long been
used in discussions of quantum mechanics to mean something along the lines of “the opposite of
operationalism”, which is certainly not intended here. Indeed, one of the main points to be made
here is that the rejection of this condition need not dismay physicists who fall into the realist camp.
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4.3 Einstein locality revisited
What becomes of our causal condition in this setting? If our original ontic theory
{Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆} obeys Einstein Locality, does this impose a condition on the three-
valued theory {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆} derived from it? First let us consider the term “cor-
relation” that we defined earlier for definite histories. There, two events A and B are
correlated if and only if γ(A) = γ(B) ∀γ ∈ Θ, which is equivalent to A∩Θ = B ∩Θ.
If this is true, what does it mean in terms of the three-valued truth valuations in
the derived three-valued theory? Any set X ⊂ Θ is either a subset of A ∩ Θ, a
subset of Ac ∩ Θ, or it intersects both. If A ∩ Θ = B ∩ Θ, in the first case we have
γ˜X(A) = γ˜X(B) = 1, in the second case we have γ˜X(A) = γ˜X(B) = 0 and in the third
case we have γ˜X(A) = γ˜X(B) = 1/2. So if A and B are correlated in the ontic theory,
it follows that γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) ∀γ˜ ∈ Θ˜ in the derived three-valued theory. It therefore
makes sense to adopt this as the definition of correlation for three-valued theories.
Note that the definition for the three-valued case seems as immediately reasonable,
on its own terms, as the original definition (indeed, it has the same form).
Now consider the following:
Einstein locality (three-valued formulation): Consider an indefinite theory
defined by {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆}, and regions X , R = J−(X ) and P = J−(X )\X . The
theory is Einstein local if the following condition holds for all regions X :
∀A ∈ Σ|R, ∃B ∈ Σ|P such that γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) ∀γ˜ ∈ Θ˜.
This is almost identical to the second formulation of Einstein locality given in sec-
tion 2.1. It is not hard to see that this condition follows if the theory {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆}
is derived from an ontic theory obeying EL. The second formulation of EL states that
every event A that occurs in R is correlated to some event B that occurs in P. If two
events are correlated in this sense in the ontic theory, it implies that γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) for
all γ˜ ∈ Θ˜ as well, as explained above. This shows that the three-valued formulation
of EL follows from the more standard definite ones. It is also important to note that
this formulation reduces to the definite formulation when only the original ontic truth
valuations are considered.
This new formulation of EL has appeal independent of its derivation from the
definite case. We have discovered that the meaning of correlation in the three-valued
case should be that γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) for all γ˜ ∈ Θ˜. If the truth values in question are
in {0, 1} this reduces to the normal definition, and when γ˜(A) = γ˜(B) = 1/2 the
definition is also reasonable: if A is determining B (or if they are both determined by
some other event) it would make little sense if one held a definite value and the other
did not. With this in mind, the new version of EL simply states that every event is
determined by an event in its past.
We also need to make sure that the ban on superluminal signalling follows from
EL, as before. This is not difficult. Again, we consider a signal event A associated to
a region A, which has to be a “free setting”, and the output event B associated to a
region B which is spacelike to A. In this case, we also have to note that both A and
B must hold definite values; it would not be a signal if the message was unknown
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to one or both parties. Freedom of the settings will still mean that we do not want
any event C in J−(A)\A (at least any such event that we need to include in our
model) to be even weakly correlated to A (or Ac). As in the case of correlation, weak
correlation also needs a counterpart for the three-valued theory.
In the ontic theory, weak correlation between C and A means that C∩Θ ⊂ A∩Θ.
Given that the setting A has a definite value, what possible three-truth values can
C and A take in a three-valued truth valuation γ˜X( ·)? If X lies completely outside
A (i.e. X ⊂ Ac), so that γ˜X(A) = 0, then γ˜X(C) = 0 also. If on the other hand
X ⊂ A, then X can still be completely inside or outside C, or neither, so in this case
γ˜X(C) can hold any of the three truth values. We find that, when A is definite, weak
correlation between C and A should mean that γ˜X(C) = 0 whenever γ˜X(A) = 0 for
all γ˜ ∈ Θ˜. Again, the definition is reasonable in its own terms.
Again, we exempt A from Einstein locality because we have deliberately left out its
causal antecedents from our model. With three-valued truth valuations, the argument
works exactly as before: signalling would mean that B is weakly correlated to A,
whereas EL implies that there is an event C associated to the past of A such that
γ˜(B) = γ˜(C) ∀ γ˜ ∈ Θ˜. But in that case C must also be weakly correlated to A,
which violates our freedom of settings assumption. So superluminal signalling is,
unsurprisingly, banned in any three-valued theory obeying EL in the above sense.
For the following argument, it is crucial to note that this argument for a ban on
superluminal signalling refers only to the three-valued version of EL and the three-
valued meaning of correlation and weak correlation; we did not have to mention the
ontic level at all.
So far, this discussion should have been quite comfortable even for those who are
most skeptical of altering logic. After all, this discussion has been nothing more than
a rewrite of the standard situation to formalise the case in which some truth values are
unknown. Of course, this rewrite alone cannot save us from Bell’s theorem13. Thus,
adding a third truth value does not, on its own, go beyond the standard picture. The
real break with the standard picture is yet to come. In order to maintain a satisfying
causal principle even when faced with Bell’s theorem, we must reject the principle of
ontic definiteness.
4.4 The break with the standard picture
What does it mean to reject ontic definiteness? It means that our theory is an
three-valued theory {Ω˜,Σ, Θ˜,M,∆} as before, but that the truth valuations in Θ˜
need no longer contain the two-valued truth valuations corresponding to the histories
in Θ from which they were derived. In other words, we no longer maintain that,
although we do not know all truth values, nonetheless “in reality” all events have
a definite truth value that we are simply ignorant of. We accept that, in some
13To prove Bell’s theorem in this context we would still need to give some idea of how to put
probabilities on our histories. Assuming ontic definiteness, it suffices to say that we would put
probabilities only on the ontic histories, or alternatively that if we did entertain probabilities for
events to be intermediate, these, and all their logical combinations, would be entirely independent
of the probabilities on the ontic histories. Bell’s theorem can then be derived as usual.
18
circumstances, there may be no meaning to hypothesising about the truth or falsity
of certain propositions. To remind us of this change in view, we will rename the
intermediate truth value “indefinite”. However, in order to avoid logical chaos, we
have retained the other rules given above for the three-valued truth valuations. In
particular, in order to be an acceptable three-valued truth valuation, it must be
possible to derive the truth valuation from members of some standard history space
Ω in the way described in section 4.2. The point can be illustrated with a simple
example.
Let us start by assuming ontic definiteness. In this simple theory there are four
allowed ontic histories. Event A corresponds to the proposition “the box is open”,
while event B corresponds to the proposition “the ball is in the box”. The four
possible histories cover every combination of truth and falsity here. Thus, two of the
histories, Ac∩B and Ac∩Bc, correspond to “the box is closed and the ball is inside”,
and “the box is closed and the ball is not inside”. Finding the derived epistemic
theory to go along with this ontic theory gives us histories signifying things like “the
box is closed and it is intermediate whether or not the ball is inside” and so on.
Now let us reject ontic definiteness. We are now free to imagine a theory in which
it is in principle impossible to know whether the ball is in the box when it is closed.
If we want such a theory, we can consider just three histories: “the box is closed and
it is indefinite whether or not the ball is inside”, “the box is open and the ball is
inside”, and “the box is open and the ball is not inside”. These can be called the
“underivable truth valuations”, or more simply the “basic truth valuations”, which
now play a role similar to that which the ontic histories played before14: all other
histories in the theory are derived from them in the way described in section 4.2. But
now, if the box is closed, no allowed truth valuation gives a definite truth value to
the event B.
This might bring Shro¨dinger’s cat to mind. However, rejecting ontic definiteness
does not imply that we must treat all boxes in the way described here, but merely
that we are liberty to describe some cases like this.
The most important thing to note here is that our accounts of Einstein Locality
and the ban on superluminal signalling still make perfect sense even if we drop ontic
definiteness. Thus we see that objections (1) and (2) against altering logic given in
section 4.1 are unfounded in this case. By rejecting ontic definiteness we do no damage
at all to the foundations on which the principle of causality is built. Instead we have,
so to speak, pulled away the table cloth while leaving the dinner set untouched.
14There seem to be two ways of thinking here. We can think of the basic truth valuations
ontologically, in which case we might be tempted to say that the intermediate events in the basic
truth valuations are “indefinite in reality”, i.e. that the truth value 1/2 as it appears in the basic
truth valuations is ontologically distinct from 0 and 1. On the other hand, we can think of them
epistemically, in which case we reject the idea that there are is anything like an ontic history at all,
and give up the idea of the basic truth valuations as possible “mirrors of reality” (something similar
to Dummet’s “antirealism” position), in which case we may prefer to say “unknown” rather than
“indefinite”. The distinction can be made – or considered meaningless – according to the taste of
the reader as it has no effect on any of the following arguments. The important thing is that the
“card game” described previously works just as well with or without ontic definiteness.
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Is there any reason to preserve ontic definiteness? To argue that it cannot be
sacrificed, one would have to come up with a reason why it is a useful or necessary
principle. However, ideas very similar to removing ontic definiteness (such as reject-
ing the law of the excluded middle in formal logic) have often been considered by
philosophers and mathematicians [40, 39]15. Besides this, it is commonly held that
quantum mechanics is telling us that not all the properties of a system can be known
even in principle; dropping ontic definiteness while preserving the logical structures
presented above is a particular formalisation of this view.
This new picture is certainly different from more na¨ıve versions of realism. But,
it can be argued, it has all the attributes that those who call themselves realists (at
least when it comes to quantum mechanics) would desire. Firstly indefinite logic
does not imply operationalism. That is, it does not rule out the attribution of truth
values to anything but operational events concerning preparations and measurements.
We can still infer definite truth values about non-operational events by applying
such an indefinite theory. So no special place need be given to the concepts of
preparation or measurement. To the contrary, applying Einstein Locality will often
require us to hypothesise events beyond the operational level to serve as explanations
of correlations. Secondly, in this new picture, truth is still universal: it is not the case
here that a proposition that “appears to be true” to an observer may in fact hold
some different truth value in the greater scheme of things. There is only one universal
truth value, 1, signifying “true”. Reliable observers should agree on all definite truth
values in the most obvious sense. In these senses, indefinite logic provides all the
objectivity that realists demand.
In addition, the new picture supplies something that previously seemed to be
impossible: even while maintaining a satisfying causal principle, consistency with the
results of quantum mechanics is possible.
4.5 The EPRB experiment
We now turn to the EPRB experiment to see how rejecting ontic definiteness allows
us to evade Bell’s theorem. In our model, there will be sixteen basic histories in Θ˜.
We have two spacelike regions A and B. Region A contains a setting event As and a
result event Ar, and similarly for B, we have Bs and Br. For instance, in the standard
EPRB scenario with spin-1/2 particles, As could correspond to the proposition “The
Stern-Gerlach detector is set to angle θ rather than φ” and Ar could mean “the
outcome is spin up”. We also require that, within A, As and Ar are associated to
two subregions As ⊂ A and Ar ⊂ A, such that As is to the past of Ar, and similarly
for B. This is done so that the setting counts as being to the past of the result.
In the mutual past P = J−(A) ∩ J−(B) we will include four more events, PA0,
PA1, PB0 and PB1. There are sixteen allowed truth valuations in Θ˜ corresponding to
the 16 possible definite truth valuations on the settings and results in regions A and
15In their discussion of “schematic worlds”, Rescher and Brandom come particularly close to the
scheme considered here, especially if the truth-value /P/ defined in section 8 of [39] is compared to
γ˜(P ) as used above.
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B. The truth values for the past events are decided as follows. For truth valuations
in which setting As is valued true, i.e. when γ˜(As) = 1, PA1 holds the same truth
value as Ar while PA0 is indefinite; when γ˜(As) = 0, PA0 holds the same truth value
as Ar while PA1 is indefinite. The situation for the B variables is the same with
B substituted for A. The truth values of these eight events are given for all of the
sixteen histories in a table to be found in appendix D.2.
Specifying these truth values does not specify the truth values for all logical com-
binations of these events, and so to give the whole truth valuation we need to supply
more. For every truth valuation in Θ˜, two of the events PA0, PA1, PB0 and PB1 have
indefinite truth values (e.g. , when γ˜(As) = γ˜(Bs) = 1, γ˜(PA0) = γ˜(PB0) = 1/2) and
so the truth values of some of their logical combinations are not given by specifying
their own truth values. Several specifications can be given here which are compatible
with our physical conditions. This issue is treated at length in appendix D.
The following argument establishes that Einstein locality condition holds for this
model. Exempting setting events from consideration as usual, it remains to show
that the outcome events Ar and Br are determined by some past event. It is not
hard to verify that γ˜((As ∩ PA1) ∪ (A
c
s ∩ PA0)) = γ˜(Ar) for all of the 16 basic truth
valuations, and similarly for the B-labelled events. Because the result events are
definite, their logical combinations are determined by logical combinations of their
causal antecedents as usual. It is also apparent that freedom of settings holds. No
past event in the model is weakly correlated to As or Bs for all of the basic truth
valuations. That is, none of the past events holds the truth value 0 whenever As
holds the truth value 0, and similarly for B, as is easily seen in the table. It is also
true that no (non-trivial) logical combination of the past events is weakly correlated
to any (non-trivial) logical combination of the setting events, as shown in appendix
D, where these issues are treated in more detail.
Putting a probability distribution on these indefinite truth valuations (whilst
maintaining freedom of settings in the probabilistic sense16) it is possible to max-
imally violate the CHSH inequalities. This is clear from the fact that the model
puts no restrictions at all on the probability distributions over the events in A and
B apart from no-signalling. Thus we can have maximal correlations – correlations
even stronger than those allowed by quantum mechanics can be achieved here – while
maintaining a causal principle that bans superluminal influence.
5 Discussion
5.1 The “meta-level” objection
The meta-level objection referred to before, in this case, is that we have exploited the
“causal loophole” or (more or less equivalently) allowed backward causation. After
all, when γ˜(PA1) = 1/2, the truth value of the setting event γ˜(As) can only be 0.
16Here this should mean that the probability of any event in the past, given that it is definite, is
independent of the probability of the settings. A similar treatment of the GHZ experiment [41, 42]
can be given with no reference to probabilities. This will be left for future work.
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Doesn’t this mean that PA1 is determining As? This is true, if one treats γ˜ not
as a truth valuation but as a list of variables describing an ontic history, and goes
on to use standard logic to talk about these 16 histories. More precisely, we can
invent a new “meta-algebra of events” Σˆ in which the “meta-events” correspond to
the truth valuations of events given by the histories γ˜. For instance, in the above
example “γ˜(PA0) = 1/2” is a meta-event. We can introduce a standard, definite truth
valuation on Σˆ, which we call a “meta-history” γˆ, corresponding to each indefinite
truth valuation γ˜. For instance, for all of the 16 meta-histories in our example,
γˆ(γ˜(PA0 = 1/2)) = 1 if and only if γ˜(PA0 = 1/2), and so on. This is what is
meant by the “meta-level” – in this way it is always possible to find a corresponding
definite theory for any indefinite theory. This meta-level objection can be leveled at
any such change in logic17. On the meta-level, standard logic applies, and we can
define theories just as before. So, as before, one of the assumptions of Bell’s theorem
mentioned above must be violated. How then could using such an altered logic bring
anything new to the discussion of Bell’s theorem?
Even looked at from this “meta-level” point of view, there is something to be
said for the altered logic set out above. There is still a set of conditions here that
bans superluminal signalling – the indefinite version of EL (which, it can be seen, is
stronger than the definite version at the meta-level), the indefinite version of freedom
of settings (which is weaker than the definite version at the meta-level) and the
condition that the setting and outcome variables can have the values 0 or 1 but
never 1/2. Together, these ban superluminal signalling. From this point of view
what we have done is to strengthen Einstein locality in such a way that we can ban
superluminal signalling. So even if we take this meta-level stance, the worst that can
be said is that we are utilising the freedom of settings loophole. Still, a condition
can indeed be stated which bans superluminal signalling and yet allows violations of
Bell’s inequalities, which is surely progress of the type we were looking for. Apart
from this, though, motivation for this new “causal principle” is somewhat opaque
from the “meta-level” point of view.
While this is certainly a possible stance to take, I will argue that it is unreasonable
to insist on this “meta-level” viewpoint. There is no justification for the claim that
the three-valued version of Einstein Locality is “not really” Einstein Locality, when it
serves exactly the same function as the definite version and is derived on exactly the
same grounds. The same holds for the three-valued version of freedom of settings.
We have already seen that they are motivated in the same way as the standard,
definite expressions, and hopefully they can be just as useful for the progress of
physics. Furthermore, the “card game” described above is intuitive and standard for
three-valued theories with ontic definiteness, and this game proceeds in exactly the
same way when ontic definiteness is dropped; in the light of this there is no reason to
retreat to a meta-level perspective in order to ensure that we can reason effectively.
Additionally, for any definite events (events for which we know the truth value) we
can reason exactly as usual. This provides a strong argument that the indefinite
17Or at least, any change in logic for which the truth of an event as determined by a reliable
observer is universal.
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statements are just as worthy of their names as their definite cousins, and that this
way of speaking can be just as meaningful, and just as useful – in fact more so because
we are no longer in contradiction with quantum mechanics18.
It is true that, when γ(PA1) = 1/2, the setting event As can only be false. From
the indefinite logic point of view there is nothing odd about that. Technically it does
not violate our freedom of settings requirement because PA1 is not weakly correlated
to As. To gain an intuition about this, we can imagine a theory that contains 3 basic
indefinite histories, corresponding to the statements “the box is closed today and
whether the ball was in it yesterday or not is indefinite”, “the box is open today and
the ball was in it yesterday” and “the box is open today and the ball was not in it
yesterday”. For this perspective there seems to be nothing strange in saying that an
event that happened in the past (the ball being in the box yesterday) can be made
definite or indefinite by an event that happens today (opening the box to check). In
particular, it would be unreasonable to claim that the later event was determined by
the earlier one (or vice-versa). All that is happened is that, if the box is open, this
gives us grounds to attribute a definite truth value to whether the ball was in there
yesterday, which are otherwise absent. Thus, it can be the case that one event (even
a past event) is “made definite” by another without them being correlated. This is
simply not what we mean by correlation, in this context.
5.2 The relation to counterfactual definiteness
The connection to the idea of counterfactual definiteness is now apparent. By drop-
ping the assumption of ontic definiteness, we can revive this “loophole”. In the
treatment of the EPRB experiment given above, it is indeed the case that no definite
value is attributed to the results of the measurements that are not performed. This
is therefore an example of lack of counterfactual definiteness. In this setting however,
the lack of counterfactual definiteness is not vulnerable to Norsen’s criticism: he de-
rives counterfactual definiteness from the assumption of local causality (note that he
could just as easily have assumed the slightly stronger Einstein Locality to reach the
same conclusion) and freedom of settings, but assuming ontic definiteness. Instead,
we have dropped Norsen’s (and Bell’s) assumption of ontic definiteness, while pre-
serving the indefinite versions of of Einstein locality and freedom of settings. This
provides a way to evade Norsen’s argument that counterfactual definiteness is re-
quired by local causality. It should, again, be stressed that making this move does
not commit us to operationalism, against which Norsen directs his argument [33].
5.3 Relation to other programmes
The idea that ontic definiteness can be dropped, allowing the preservation of a mean-
ingful relativistic principle of causality without contradicting quantum mechanics,
18An argument for a similar claim is made at length in [39]. There, it is argued that Rescher and
Brandom’s inconsistent semantics need not be considered as merely derivative from the standard
one, but could just as easily be considered the basic case from which the standard one is derived, a
stance the authors call “the parity thesis” (see in particular section 13 of [39]).
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should be of interest generally in inquiries into the foundations of quantum me-
chanics. It is also of specific interest to more than one programme for interpreting
quantum mechanics. On its own, dropping ontic definiteness does not provide an in-
terpretation, but only a new way to evade Bell’s theorem. Nevertheless, as has been
noted, one of the prime decisions to be made when interpreting quantum mechanics
(whether in an operationalist way or not) is what assumption of Bell’s theorem to
drop. Using the newly uncovered assumption to build a full interpretation is surely
of interest.
The most obviously related programme is the Ψ-epistemic approach. Here, the
quantum state is viewed, not as reflective of an element of reality (i.e. not ontologi-
cally), but instead as expressing our state of knowledge about the system in question.
Spekkens has proposed a toy model relying on these ideas that qualitatively repro-
duces many interesting features of quantum mechanics [4]. He introduces a principle
under which, in a particular well-defined sense, the truth values of only half of all
events can ever be known at once, thus limiting the possible epistemic states to al-
ways be “coarser grained” than the ontic states. This is moving very near to the
direction this article has taken. However, although the possible epistemic states are
limited in the toy model, it is still assumed that ontic states exist, from which the
epistemic states are derived as above in section 4.2. As we have seen, jettisoning this
assumption allows us to evade Bell’s theorem. It would be most interesting to see if
Spekken’s toy model can be improved by removing the assumption of ontic definite-
ness, allowing it to model all interesting features of quantum mechanics, including
the stronger-than-classical correlations. For instance, perhaps the model could be
altered to produce “stabiliser-group quantum theory” (a reduced version of standard
quantum theory), which has been found to be very similar to the toy model [43]. If
this could be achieved, the new toy model would indeed be able to do better than
the original one in modelling the strong correlations found in GHZ states [41, 42].
Connections can also be found to the anhomomorphic logic program [24, 25, 26].
In this approach to quantum mechanics, as here, the algebra of events is Boolean as in
standard logic, and their truth values are still in {0, 1}, but the truth valuation need
not be homomorphic (so, for example, if A is false and B is false it does not necessarily
follow that A∪B is false). The are many possible ways to weaken the rules of classical
logic after abandoning homomorphic truth valuations. Interestingly, the one that has
turned out to be most useful for quantum mechanics, the “multiplicative scheme”,
bears strong similarities to the ideas set out above. That is, there is a one-to-one
map between truth valuations and subsets of the history space Ω, as above. In the
truth valuation corresponding to subset X , the event A is true if and only if A ⊃ X .
This is also true for the derived three-valued truth valuations described above, as
noted in section 4.2. The difference is that, in anhomomorphic logic there are only
two truth values, and so all other events are designated false (whereas, in the derived
three-valued truth valuations, only events A such that Ac ⊃ X are false, and the
rest are intermediate). We see here that for every truth valuation in anhomomorphic
logic, it is easy to substitute an indefinite truth valuation. The events given indefinite
truth values are exactly those events A for which, in the anhomomorphic “co-event”,
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A and Ac are both deemed false19. Methods have already been proposed to derive the
set of possible anhomomorphic truth valuations from quantum mechanical theories.
This supplies a “ready-made” interpretation of quantum mechanics with indefinite
histories and no ontic definiteness. However, one would still have to prove in each case
that the theory obeyed Einstein locality (or the weaker relativistic causal principle
hinted at near the end of section 2.1) in this interpretation. As yet, the theory
contains no general rule that explictly ensures this.
It is also natural to wonder about the connection to the topos-based approach to
quantum interpretation pioneered by Butterfield, Do¨ring and Isham [22, 23]. This
approach also alters logic, but similarities do not go much further. In this approach,
what an observer would normally call true should properly be considered only “true
to them”, or true only in their particular context. This is in contrast to the case
discussed above where there is one truth value meaning “true”, 1, which is universal.
This is the main reason why it is difficult simply to transpose the discussion of causal
principles given here to the case of the topos-based approach. The discussion of
whether a satisfying causal principle can be maintained in that interpretation may,
for this reason, have more similarities to the discussion for many-worlds approaches.
6 Conclusion
This paper began by noting that Bell’s theorem seems to prevent us from maintaining
a satisfying relativistic principle of causation. When interpreting quantum mechanics,
we seem to be faced with a choice between maintaining the principle of common cause,
or relativistic causal structure. Thus the road chosen here depends on whether or not
we see causality as a necessary part of any satisfying theory.
In this article, it has been shown that there is a hidden assumption that forces us
to make this choice. Ontic definiteness is the principle that, whether we can (even
in principle) have grounds to know them or not, every proposition about physical
systems must have a definite truth value, “true” or “false”. We have seen that this
principle in no way underpins either the causal principle of Einstein Locality, or the
assumption of freedom of settings used in Bell’s theorem. However, it does under-
pin Bell’s derivation of a contradiction with the predictions of quantum mechanics,
starting with these principles. We are left with a choice: we can either abandon the
demand for a satisfying relativistic causal principle, or we can abandon the principle
of ontic definiteness. Abandoning ontic definiteness seems to do no damage to the
demands made by physicists who defend realism: we are still allowed, and moreover
required, to make inferences about facts beyond the operational level. On the other
hand, those who reject approaches like deBroglie-Bohm pilot wave theory on the
grounds that they contradict locality should find nothing to object to either.
There is a strong case to be made that, if we have to do without one, maintaining
ontic definiteness is less desirable than maintaining a satisfying causal principle. Ar-
guments have been given above that no other way of evading Bell’s theorem allows a
19This line of thought also suggests that the above evasion of Bell’s theorem could be re-written
in the anhomomophic logic language.
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satisfying causal principle to be maintained. When interpreting quantum mechanics,
therefore, dropping ontic definiteness is not only a new option, but is arguably the
most attractive one available.
This raises the question of what such an interpretation would look like. Above,
it was suggested that simple models in the spirit of Spekken’s toy model could be
constructed to gain a better understanding of this. One of the major questions here
concerns the strength of correlations in quantum theory. Without ontic definiteness,
Einstein locality allows the strongest non-signalling correlations that are logically
possible, while quantum mechanics places restrictions on the strength of correlations.
It is very interesting to ask whether this can be explained as the result of any simple
set of physical principles. These issues are of current interest for those studying
foundational issues in quantum information, for example. The same question arises
for this new programme. If Einstein locality alone does not imply the quantum
restrictions on correlations, will it do the job when supplemented by other physical
principles, and if so, what are they? Hopefully, toy models can shed more light on
this issue.
Other interesting extensions include the application to quantum gravity. It is
arguable that a proper understanding of quantum mechanics is a prerequisite for this.
But even so, it is interesting to ask at this stage what the principle of Einstein Locality
would look like if we removed the assumption of a fixed background spacetime. With
general covariance in mind, this may require answers to some deep questions, along
the lines of “what is a region?”. Perhaps addressing the issue in the conceptually
simpler context of causal sets will lead to progress here.
There are many other avenues for future work. One is to study Mermin’s formu-
lation of the GHZ experiment [42] in the light of the ontic definiteness assumption.
Beyond this, it would be of use to study indefinite logic independently of the deriva-
tion from standard logic, and to consider the role of probabilities more carefully.
We have seen that principles of causation, and the physicist’s notion of realism, are
closely intertwined concepts. By further studying the consequences of rejecting ontic
definiteness, it should be possible to make further progress in the task of restoring a
satisfying picture of the microworld to our physical theories.
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A Causal Principles: what are they good for?
A.1 Defending the causal principle
In section 2 it was asserted that finding a satisfying causal principle that is compatible
with quantum theory may help us to make scientific progress. A few comments by
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way of clarification and justification of this statement are given in this appendix.
Causation furnishes us with an important mode of explanation. Requiring causal
explanation often means requiring the hypothesis of new events (in the sense in which
the word is used above) to serve as common causes for otherwise unexplained cor-
relations. This is part of the story of discovering new substances and processes. As
a simple example, consider a case in which the movement of one tree is correlated
to the movement of another tree. Let us assume that we have good reason to think
that the movement of one tree is not in itself causing the movement of the other.
In this case, it would be strange to explain the simultaneous movement of two trees
by stating that it is in the nature of trees to move simultaneously, and leave it at
that. Instead, the PCC requires us to posit a new effect that furnishes the common
causes for the simultaneous movement of trees. In this way we enrich the subjects of
our physical inquiry from the initially apparent events (which all have to do with the
properties of trees) to new events (having to do with the wind).
Indeed, having gained confidence in our wind theory, we make no fundamental di-
vision between the events we originally categorised as “apparent” and those which we
inferred from them using the causal principle. The boundaries of what is considered
operationally “apparent” and what is not can also change if we take the causal princi-
ple seriously: for example the electromagnetic field, at first taken as inferred through
its effects on matter, is in modern theories no more or less deserving of a special
“apparent” status than matter fields. It is interesting to note that taking a strictly
operational point of view (though it might be useful as a means of shedding unnec-
essary assumptions present in previous theories) prevents this kind of advance, by
fixing the divide between the events that are considered apparent and the rest. Thus,
the causal principle is closely intertwined with the realistic (i.e. non-operational)
world-view. Moreover, it is interesting to ask: is there any use in insisting on a
non-operational point of view without also insisting on a satisfying causal principle?
In quantum mechanics we may well be able to solve the measurement problem by
denying the PCC. But in so doing, we give up the possibility of enriching the subjects
of our physical inquiry by using a causal principle.
A.2 Banning superluminal signalling is not enough
From an operational standpoint, it is tempting to ask: if we want a causal principle
that bans superluminal signalling, why not simply take the ban on superluminal
signalling itself to be the causal principle? However, there is a good reason to make
a distinction between the two ideas. In the example of the previous section, we
might shake one of the trees, and observe that distant trees are not caused to move.
This certainly adds to the evidence that there is no direct causal link between the
movement of the two trees. But it does not do anything to generate an explanation
of why the trees’ movement is correlated despite this, leading to our discovery of the
effect of wind. A true causal principle, like the PCC, can do this for us. As argued in
the previous section, one of the points of reinstating a causal principle is to be able
to talk about events that are not directly observable (or not at first considered to
be), and so it defeats the object to retreat to an operational point of view .
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There is another related reason not to accept the ban on superluminal signalling
as a satisfying causal principle: doing so would confuse superluminal influence with
superluminal signalling. For example, imagine that we often observed a bright light
being emitted from every point on a spacelike path through spacetime. When trying
to design a physical theory that explained this effect, it would be very unnatural to
aim for a theory in which there was no superluminal influence. But it could still be the
case that these effects could not be controlled and used to signal. A reasonable theory
here could maintain a ban on superluminal signalling, but not a ban on superluminal
influence in general. It is superluminal influence in the more general sense that is
banned by a satisfying relativistic causal principle.
A.3 The challenge of causal antifundamentalism
Some recent arguments have been made that the idea of a causal principle should,
at this stage in the development of science, be rejected as a universal principle for
science. This is not the converse of the “modest assertion” made at the beginning
of section 2, and so need not concern us too much, but the claims still deserve
some discussion in this context. Butterfield has also discussed Norton’s stance in the
context of relativistic causality and quantum mechanics in [44].
Arthur Fine questions whether correlations need explanation [45]. Essentially, he
is advocating dropping the PCC as a response to the problems of quantum mechanics.
Hopefully the arguments of the previous subsection are sufficient to give question
to this. John Norton gives a more historically-based criticism of causation as a
fundamental principle of science [31]. He argues:
Mature sciences, I maintain, are adequate to account for their realms
without need of supplement by causal notions and principles. The latter
belong to earlier efforts to understand our natural world, or to simplified
reformulations of our mature theories, intended to trade precision for in-
telligibility. In this sense I will characterize causal notions as belonging
to a kind of folk science, a crude and poorly grounded imitation of more
developed sciences.
One part of Norton’s argument is that our idea of causation has had to be redefined
after major developments in physics, leading one to suspect that there exists no
general form for what he calls “causal notions” at all. He also argues that some
examples even in Newtonian mechanics show violations of causal principles. Finally
he brings up the very real problem of Bell’s theorem. If Norton’s position, which he
dubs “causal antifundamentalism”, is correct, we can conclude that theories should
not be considered inadequate because they fail to obey a causal principle (like a
version of the PCC), since causal principles are simply folk-science and may have
already become obsolete.
Norton’s position deserves serious consideration. In particular it is hard to argue
that the casual principle must be defined once and for all, and preserved through
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every possible development in science. Nevertheless, I will argue that it is worthwhile
to preserve a well-defined causal principle for the time being.
To the first point, the fact that “causal notions” have had to be refined, and
that, at some points in history, our best understanding of them has been considered
problematic, need not suggest their eventual dissolution. This has not, for example,
been the case for “gravitational notions”. Neither are the pathological examples
given from Newtonian mechanics very worrying for those who seek to reinstate the
idea of a causal principle in modern physics. To start with the examples are based
on highly unphysical examples (in one example, a perfect ball must be positioned at
an exact point on an object with an infinitely precise profile). They can, no doubt,
easily be removed by appending reasonable and near-trivial restrictions to Newtonian
mechanics, rendering the theory (non-relativistically, deterministically) causal. More
importantly for practical purposes (although this does not contradict Norton), the
use of causal arguments may yet have been important to the development of various
theories despite their failure in pathological cases. The remaining argument is that we
have managed to make huge advances in quantum mechanics, a theory in which the
causal principle is still mysterious. This is certainly an important point to consider.
But it proves neither that there is no satisfying causal principle to be found here, nor
that it is not advisable to find and use it.
Norton’s argument that modern theories do not need to be supplemented by causal
principles in order to function does not affect my argument that causal principles can
be a useful tool for understanding them, in order (amongst other things) to develop
yet more powerful theories. One explanation of correlations between events is that
our theory allows (or requires) such correlations. But this presupposes that such a
theory exists. This “static” view of theory ignores a crucial role of causation as a
means of developing theories, as the tree example elucidates.
Finally, it is interesting to wonder why, if it is possible, anyone would object to
reinstating a satisfying causal principle in quantum mechanics. Before Bell’s theorem
was known, this was a possibility that had yet to be checked. Objecting even to
attempts to reinstate the causal principle in these circumstances seems quite perverse.
Bell himself used the analogy of “the glove left at home” to explain this:
If I find that I have bought one glove, and that it is right-handed, then I
predict confidently that the one still at home will be seen to be left-handed.
But suppose we had been told, on good authority, that gloves are neither
right- or left-handed when not looked at. Then that, by looking at one,
we could predetermine the result of looking the other, in some remote
place, would be remarkable. Finding that this is so in practice, we would
very soon invent the idea that gloves are already one thing or the other
even when not looked at. And we would begin to doubt the authorities
that had assured us otherwise.
[3] Indeed, this is the substance of the EPR debate, as Bell notes. Elsewhere he is
quoted as saying of the EPRB experiment:
For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments
carry with them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling
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them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that when Einstein
saw that, and the others refused to see it, he [not Bohr] was the rational
man... so for me, it is a pity that Einstein’s idea doesn’t work. The
reasonable thing just doesn’t work.
[46] Here, the view set out in the present paper is that Bell is, although not in so
many words, mourning the loss of a satisfying relativistic causal principle to modern
physics due to its apparent incompatibility with the predictions of quantum mechan-
ics. Above, it is shown that Bell’s impasse can be avoided by dropping the assumption
of ontic definiteness. It is true that dropping this principle is a greater leap than Ein-
stein initially foresaw when he proposed that quantum mechanics should be causally
“completed” while respecting relativistic “locality”. But on the other hand, since a
road towards Einstein’s goal is now open, it seems unreasonable to advocate against
pursuing it.
B Comparing causal principles
B.1 The two formulations of Einstein locality
In section 2.1 it was claimed that the two definitions of Einstein Locality that were
given were equivalent. This claim is proved in this appendix.
First let us assume the first formulation and derive the second. For every history
γ∗P ∈ Ω|P of events in the past region P, there exists a history γ
∗
R ∈ Ω|R for R such
that for all γ ∈ Θ, if γ|P = γ
∗
P then γ|R = γ
∗
R. This implies the following:
∀γ ∈ Θ, γ′ ∈ Θ, A ∈ Σ|R, γ|P = γ
′|P ⇒ γ(A) = γ
′(A). (1)
In words, all allowed histories that match on P give the same truth value to all
events associated to R. This allows us to construct an event associated to P that
shares the same truth value as A for all allowed histories:
B = {γ ∈ Ω : γ|P = γ
′|P ⇒ γ
′(A) = 1 ∀γ′ ∈ Θ}. (2)
For any γ∗P ∈ Ω|P , the event {γ ∈ Ω : γ|P = γ
∗
P} is associated to P by the
definition of Ω|P , and the event B is associated to P by virtue of being the union of a
set of such events. It remains to show that the event B is correlated to A. Consider an
allowed history γ ∈ Θ such that γ(A) = 1. Any such history will fulfil the condition
in (2) due to (1), and so it will be in B, giving γ(B) = 1 in this case. Any γ ∈ Θ
such that γ(A) = 0 will fail the condition of (2) for the same reason, and will not be
in B, giving γ(B) = 0. Thus γ(A) = γ(B) for all γ ∈ Θ, or in other words, they are
correlated. For an arbitrary event A ∈ Σ|R, we have found an event B ∈ Σ|P that is
correlated to A, and thus satisfied the second definition of Einstein locality.
Now let us consider the converse case. We start with the assumption that ∀A ∈
Σ|R, ∃B ∈ Σ|P such that γ(A) = γ(B) ∀γ ∈ Θ. Consider an event A = {γ ∈ Ω :
γ|R = γ
∗
R} for some γ
∗
R ∈ Ω|R. This event is associated to R. Note that for all
histories γ ∈ Ω, γ|R = γ
∗
R if and only if γ(A) = 1. By the second formulation of EL,
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there is an event B ∈ Σ|P correlated to A. In other words, for all histories γ ∈ Θ if
γ(B) = 1 then γ(A) = 1, and so γ|R = γ
∗
R. The history restricted to P, γ|P fixes the
truth value of B. Also, for every history γ ∈ Ω there exists some γ∗R such that B is
true. Thus, for every restricted history γ∗P ∈ Ω|P , there exists a history γ
∗
R ∈ Ω|R for
R such that for all γ ∈ Θ, if γ|P = γ
∗
P then γ|R = γ
∗
R. We have recovered the first
formulation of Einstein locality.
B.2 The two formulations of the Nonprobabilistic PCC
In 2.1 two formulations of a non-probabilistic principle of common cause are given,
called NPPCm and NPCCj. These formulations are claimed to be equivalent. These
claims are proved in this section.
The context is a nonprobabilistic theory defined by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, two spacelike
regions A and B, their “joint past” Pj = J
−(A) ∪ J−(B)\(A∪B) as shown in figure
2 and their “mutual past” Pm = J
−(A)∪J−(B). The theory obeys the NPCCj if the
following principle holds: for any pair of events A ∈ Σ|A and B ∈ Σ|B, if A and B
are correlated, then there exists a “common cause” event C ∈ Σ|Pj that is correlated
to both A and B. The definition of NPCCm is the same with Pj replaced by Pm.
First, it is easy to see that NPPCm implies and NPCCj. NPPCm requires that
all pairs of correlated events A and B as described above have common cause event
in the mutual past Pj = J
−(A) ∩ J−(B). This is a subset of the joint past Pm =
J−(A) ∪ J−(B)\(A∪B). Thus, if there is a common cause event in the mutual past
then there is also one in the mutual past, and NPCCm is also satisfied.
Conversely, consider the regions Y = J−(A)\J−(B) and Z = J−(B)\J−(A).
Because A ⊂ Y and B ⊂ Z, Σ|A is a subalgebra of Σ|Y and Σ|B is a subalgebra of
Σ|Z . Thus A ∈ Σ|Y and B ∈ Σ|Z . If the joint past version of the NPCC holds for all
pairs of spacelike regions, then it must apply to Y and Z. The joint past of Y and Z
is Pm = J
−(A) ∩ J−(B). Applying the joint past version of the NPCC we see that,
if A and B are correlated, then there exists an event C ∈ Σ|Pm that is correlated to
both B and C. Thus the mutual past version of the NPCC also holds. This proves
that NPCCm follows from NPCCj, and as a corrolary that NPCCm and NPCCj are
equivalent. This result, and the proofs, are similar to those already known for the
probabilistic case [29].
This result may seem questionable on first sight. Why can’t the entire chain of
causal antecedents of A lie in J−(A)\A but outside of J−(B), and similarly for B,
so that there is no common cause in the mutual past? Yet we have proved that
the NPCCm principles follows from NPCCj, which is justified on general grounds.
Could there be something wrong with our assumptions, therefore? But we should
consider what it means for the entire chain of causal antecedents of A to lie outside
of J−(B). If there is an initial cosmological spatial hypersurface beyond which no
past exists, this would imply that there are two events on that surface (one the causal
antecedent of A, and the other of B), at spacelike positions, that are correlated to each
other. NPCCj disallows these “initial correlations” as they have no common cause
(similarly “correlations that propagate in from past infinity” are banned). This point
is discussed in [29] for the probabilistic case.
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B.3 Einstein locality and screening off
It was also claimed in section 2.1 that Einstein locality implied a certain stochastic
relativistic causality condition when a probability distribution was put on Θ. This
is now shown. Along similar lines, Bell comments that a deterministic version of
causality follows from his local causality when probabilities are restricted to be 1 and
0 [3].
Consider two spacelike spacetime regions A and B, their union C = A ∪ B, their
joint past region R = J−(A∪B) and their exclusive past P = R\(A∪ B), as shown
in figure 2. According to the first formulation of Einstein locality, for every history
γ∗P ∈ Ω|P of events in the past region P, there exists a history γ
∗
R ∈ Ω|R for R such
that for all γ ∈ Θ, if γ|P = γ
∗
P then γ|R = γ
∗
R. Since C is a subregion of R, it also
holds that for every history γ∗P ∈ Ω|P of events in the past region P, there exists
a history γ∗C ∈ Ω|C such that for all γ ∈ Θ, if γ|P = γ
∗
P then γ|C = γ
∗
C. Similar
statements also hold for the regions A and B.
Consider a probability distribution µ on Ω with support in Θ, and assume Einstein
Locality. Consider also the event P = {γ ∈ Ω : γ|P = γ
∗
P}, which we can call a “full
specification” of P. Conditioning on P is equivalent to fixing the history restricted to
P to be γ∗P . According to the first formulation of EL, this also fixes the history on C
to some value γ∗C, and hence fixes the the history in A and B, making all probabilities
conditioned on P either 0 or 1. This means that, for all events C associated with
C, µ(C|P ) = 0 if γ∗C(C) = 0 and µ(C|P ) = 1 if γ
∗
C(C) = 1. For any pair of events
A associated to A and B associated to B, the fact that γ∗C is a homomorphism then
implies that µ(A|P )µ(B|P ) = µ(A ∩ B|P ). In other words, we have shown that all
pairs of events A and B (associated to regions A and B respectively) are statistically
uncorrelated when conditioned on any full specification of events in their joint past
region P. This “screening off” condition is called SO2 in [29]. This SO2 condition
has been shown to be equivalent to the similar condition (called SO1) in which the
“mutual past” J−(A∩B) is substituted for the joint past in the definition [29], which
is essentially the same as one of Bell’s formulations of local causality (given in “The
theory of Local Beables” [2]).
C Comparison with Reichenbach’s logic
In several important senses, the logic introduced in section 4.2 has a precursor in
Reichenbach’s three-valued logic [21]. Reichenbach also identified problems with
standard treatments of quantum mechanics, amongst them “causal anomalies”, and
sought to remedy them by introducing a third truth value which he termed “indeter-
minacy”. However, there are important differences between the approaches. Firstly,
Reichenbach’s work on three-valued logic was prior to Bell’s on non-locality, and to
Reichenbach’s own later work on the principle of common cause. His discussion has
nothing explicit to say about the problem of restoring the PCC in the face of Bell’s
theorem, therefore. Moreover, the scheme given above is not a simple extension of
Reichenbach’s ideas to solve the problem in hand; there are also significant technical
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differences.
In the approach above, the normal Boolean algebra of events in retained, and only
the normal logical operations are extended to the three-valued logic. In contrast,
Reichenbach allows completely general logical operations, mapping the “input” truth
values of events and pairs of events to the “outputs” in all possible combinations.
For example, the logic employed above implies the rule γ˜(A) = 1 ⇒ γ˜(Ac) = 0,
γ˜(A) = 1/2 ⇒ γ˜(Ac) = 1/2, γ˜(A) = 0 ⇒ γ˜(Ac) = 1. For Reichenbach this is only
one of the possible logical operations with one argument. As well as this “diametrical
negation” which he terms −A he considers “cyclical negation” ∼ A that gives γ˜(A) =
1 ⇒ γ˜(∼ A) = 1/2, γ˜(A) = 1/2 ⇒ γ˜(∼ A) = 0, γ˜(A) = 0 ⇒ γ˜(∼ A) = 1 (our
set theoretic notation, which implies a Boolean algebra of events, fails here, but
hopefully the meaning remains clear). Likewise there are novel two-argument logical
operations in Reichenbach’s approach. Every logical operation of this type is allowed.
Thus, there are events in the three-valued logic corresponding to all the events at the
meta-level described in section 5.1 (i.e. that have the same definite truth value as
the given meta-level event). Given this, Reichenbach’s approach does not allow the
strategy used above to give a causal explanation of the EPRB experiment: using
the novel logical operations, an event can be defined in the past that is correlated
with the setting events, violating our assumptions. Consider the model of the EPRB
experiment given in section 4.5. Defining a logical operation “is definite”, ?A, such
that γ˜(A) = 1/2 ⇒ γ˜(?A) = 0, γ˜(A) = 0 or 1 ⇒ γ˜(?A) = 0, we find that the
event ?PA1 determines the setting As. Thus admitting Reichenbach’s extra logical
operations leads to a version of the “meta-level” objection discussed in section 5.1.
The answers to the objection are the same. Nothing forces us to allow these operations
in our new logic; indeed, from the perspective given in the main text they appear to
be an unnatural addition.
Another feature of Reichenbach’s approach is that is it explicitly operationalist
in character. Thus he states “it is possible to introduce an intermediate truth value
which may be called indeterminacy, and to coordinate this truth value to the group
of statements which in the Bohr-Heisenberg interpretation are called meaningless” –
that is, propositions about unmeasured properties. With this operational meaning
for the third truth value, the principle of common cause that Reichenbach later
formulated cannot be restored, as argued in section 3.2.
However, there are several points from Reichenbach’s discussion that do carry
over. One is that complimentarity can be given a meaning based on truth values in
the logical system. Two events A and B may be considered complimentary if and
only if, for all γ˜ ∈ Θ˜, γ˜(A) = 1/2 if and only if γ˜(B) 6= 1/2. Thus events PA0 and
PA1 in section 4.5 are complimentary. This observation is based on a point made by
Reichenbach, although in this context the definition of complimentarity is expanded
somewhat from its usual operational setting.
Reichenbach also recognises that introducing a third truth value may have an im-
pact on the EPR “paradox”. After noting that Bohr’s opinions on EPR “do not seem
to us to be stated sufficiently clearly to admit of an unambiguous interpretation”,
Reichenbach confirms with EPR that “what is proved by the existence of correlated
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systems is that it is not permissable to say that the value of an entity before the mea-
surement is different from the value resulting in the measurement” (added italics)
– if, the context suggests, one assumes relativistic causal structure. Reichenbach’s
proposed solution to the problem is that this italicised statement, though untrue,
may not be false but instead hold the indeterminate truth value. However, it is
not clear that Reichenbach’s proposal saves us from “causal anomalies”, as he calls
them, because it is not made clear exactly what constitutes a causal anomaly in the
EPR setting, especially once the three-valued logic is introduced. This clarification
would have to wait for the later work of Reichenbach, and Bell, on causal principles.
The three-valued definition of Einstein Locality given in section 4.3 provides such
a definition for a three-valued logic. Using this definition, Reichenbach’s proposed
solution is not adequate, as he does not provide causal antecedents for the inarguably
determinate events: the measurement outcomes20.
D More details of the EPRB experiment
This appendix gives some further explanation and discussion of points covered in
section 4.5.
D.1 More on free settings
Before we come to discuss the details of the EPRB experiment, more needs to be
said about the role of free settings. In the EPRB experiment there is more than one
setting, and so questions arise beyond those already addressed in sections 2.2 and
4.3. For example, should logical combinations of settings also be treated as settings?
And should events that are logical combinations of settings and other events require
causal antecedents? We need to be more systematic about such questions to ensure
that our model the EPRB experiment obeys freedom of settings and Einstein Locality
for all events. We will start with the case of standard two-valued logic.
Setting events are a set of events in Σ. We will say that logical combinations of
settings are also settings, i.e. the settings form a subalgebra of Σ (this may seem odd
in that the “trivial events” Ω and ∅ now qualify as settings, but this is the easiest
way to proceed).
The main condition on settings is that they are not influenced by any past events
in the model. Consider a setting A associated to region A. If A ∩ Θ is a proper
subset of Θ (i.e. if there are histories in Θ for which A is false), then there can be
no event C associated to J−(A)\A such that C 6= ∅ and C ∩ Θ ⊂ A ∩ Θ. In other
words C cannot be weakly correlated to A except in trivial cases. As well as this,
settings associated to disjoint regions should not be weakly correlated to each other,
a condition easily satisfied in the model of the EPRB experiment.
20Perhaps the “meta-level version” of EL mentioned in section 5.1 would be more appropriate for
Reichenbach’s logic, but again this runs into trouble if the truth “value of an entity” in a distant
region can be changed from 1/2 to 1 or 0 by the free choice of an experiment.
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As well as these conditions on settings, the causal condition of Einstein Locality is
weakened for settings. This is because settings are supposed to be a “free choice”, and
thus whatever it is that determines them need not be relevant for the rest of the model
(for example, if we decided the settings based on what we had for breakfast, it should
not be necessary to include our breakfast in the model to get a good description of
the system in question). In order to exempt signals from Einstein Locality, we will
weaken the second formulation of Einstein Locality given above.
As before we have a region X , its past R = J−(X ) and its “exclusive past”
P = J−(X )\X as shown in figure 1. The set Σ|P is the subalgebra of events associated
to the past region. Consider now the subalgebra Σsettings generated by Σ|P and the
setting events associated to R.
Einstein Locality (with settings): Consider a nonprobabilistic theory defined
by {Ω,Σ,Θ,M,∆}, and regions X , R = J−(X ) and P = J−(X )\X . The theory is
Einstein local if the following condition holds for all regions X :
∀A ∈ Σ|R, ∃B ∈ Σsettings such that γ(A) = γ(B) ∀γ ∈ Θ.
Previously, all causal antecedents had to be in the past region P. Now we have
expanded the allowed causal antecedents to also include setting events in the region
R itself. Thus settings are exempted in the sense that they are allowed to be their
own causal antecedents, which is a trivial requirement. This also deals with events
that are logical combinations of settings with other events. Consider for example the
event A ∩ B where A is a free setting associated to region A and B is a non-setting
event associated to a spacelike region B. Here, B itself requires a causal antecedent
which we can call D, but A ∩D is an acceptable causal antecedent for A ∩ B, even
though this event is not associated to J−(A ∪ B)\(A ∪ B).
As in the main text, these rules are easily extended to the case of theories using
the three truth values. In this case, we still require the settings to form a subalgebra
of Σ. To prevent past influence on settings, we require the following (which follows
for the derived three-valued theory from the condition above for two-valued theories,
in the same way as in section 4.3). Consider a setting A associated to region A. If
there exists γ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that γ˜(A) = 0, then there can be no event C associated
to J−(A)\A such that, for all γ˜ ∈ Θ˜, γ˜(C) = 0 whenever γ˜(A) = 0, and that is
nontrivial in the sense that there exists γ˜ ∈ Θ˜ such that γ˜(C) = 1. This is the three-
valued version of the statement that C cannot be weakly correlated to A except in
trivial cases.
Again, the statement of Einstein locality with settings is the same as the statement
without settings, found in section 4.3 except with Σsettings replacing Σ|P . These
conditions – freedom of settings and Einstein locality with the exemption for settings
– are the ones that the EPRB experiment must obey.
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D.2 Application to the EPRB experiment
In the model of the EPRB experiment provided in the text, 16 basic three-valued
truth valuations are provided for the events of the model: the setting events As and
Bs, the results events Ar and Br, and the four P variables assigned to the past. The
following is a table showing the truth values for these events in each of these 16 truth
valuations:
i γ˜i(As) γ˜i(Bs) γ˜i(Ar) γ˜i(Br) γ˜i(PA0) γ˜i(PA1) γ˜i(PB0) γ˜i(PB1)
1 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 1/2
2 0 0 0 1 0 1/2 1 1/2
3 0 0 1 0 1 1/2 0 1/2
4 0 0 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/2
5 0 1 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 0
6 0 1 0 1 0 1/2 1/2 1
7 0 1 1 0 1 1/2 1/2 0
8 0 1 1 1 1 1/2 1/2 1
9 1 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2
10 1 0 0 1 1/2 0 1 1/2
11 1 0 1 0 1/2 1 0 1/2
12 1 0 1 1 1/2 1 1 1/2
13 1 1 0 0 1/2 0 1/2 0
14 1 1 0 1 1/2 0 1/2 1
15 1 1 1 0 1/2 1 1/2 0
16 1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1/2 1
This table, however, does not fully specify the sixteen truth valuations {γ˜i( ·)}.
What, for example, is the value of γ˜1(PA1 ∪PB1)? The answer to questions like these
does not follow from the values in the truth table above as it would for classical
logic. As explained in section 4.2, to specify these it is sufficient to specify a set of
definite truth valuations from which the history is derived. Consider for example the
following four definite histories:
i γi(As) γi(Bs) γi(Ar) γi(Br) γi(PA0) γi(PA1) γi(PB0) γi(PB1)
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Indefinite truth valuations derived from subsets of this set can produce the truth
values given for γ˜1( ·) above. To give γ˜1(PA1) = γ˜1(PB1) = 1/2 the subset must
contain at least one definite truth valuation with each value for PA1 and PB1. The
sets X = {γ1( ·), γ4( ·)} and Y = {γ2( ·), γ3( ·)} have this property. These correspond
to saying that, while the truth values given to PA1 and PB1 are indefinite, there are
still definite statements to be made about their logical combinations. For example
γ˜Y (PB1 ∪ PA1) = 1 as this event has truth value 1 for both γ2( ·) and γ3( ·). The set
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Z = {γ1( ·), γ2( ·), γ3( ·), γ4( ·)} and all the three-member subsets also qualify, giving
less definite events. As an example γ˜1( ·) can be set equal to γ˜Z( ·), and similarly,
each other allowed history γ˜i( ·) can be derived from the set of four definite histories
that share the definite truth values listed for γ˜i( ·) in the first table above.
However, we can see that several sets of truth valuations following the table above
will satisfy our conditions of Einstein locality and freedom of settings. For the proof
of freedom of settings, we will need to make the specification that for all sixteen of the
indefinite truth valuations listed in the table, the conjunction of the two indefinite past
events gives the same value w, which can be 0 or 1/2. In other words, γ˜k(PA1∩PB1) =
γ˜l(PA1 ∩ PB0) = γ˜m(PA0 ∩ PB1) = γ˜n(PA0 ∩ PB0) = w for all values of the indices
such that 1 ≤ k ≤ 4, 5 ≤ l ≤ 8, 9 ≤ m ≤ 12 and 13 ≤ n ≤ 16. Similarly, unique
values x, y, and z must be given to the conjunctions of the indefinite past events
and their compliments. That is, γ˜k(PA1 ∩ P
c
B1) = γ˜l(PA1 ∩ P
c
B0) = γ˜m(PA0 ∩ P
c
B1) =
γ˜n(PA0 ∩ P
c
B0) = x under the same conditions on the indices as before, and similarly
for P cA1∩PB1 and P
c
A1∩P
c
B1 and y and z. Specifying these four variables specifies all of
the truth values for each truth valuation. While there are other specifications of the
truth valuations consistent with the above table that would also obey our physical
conditions, the main point of interest here is that even one exists.
The settings here are Ar and Br but also all logical combinations of them such
as Ar ∩ Br, Ar ∩ B
c
r, and so on. Firstly, it will be shown that Einstein locality in
the “settings version” holds. We do not require causal antecedents for the P events
(or any non-trivial logical combinations with them) as they are the earliest events
that we have modelled21). Thus we only need establish causal antecedents for events
associated with the remaining region A ∪ B. As mentioned in the main text, it
can be seen from the table above that Ar and Br have causal antecedents, because
γ˜((As∩PA1)∪(A
c
s∩PA0)) = γ˜(Ar) for all of the 16 basic histories, and similarly for Br.
The “causal antecedents” of the settings are themselves. All other events associated
with A ∪ B are logical combinations of these events. The causal antecedent of any
logical combination of such events simply the same logical combination of the causal
antecedents of these events. This covers all events in the model, establishing Einstein
Locality.
It remains to show freedom of settings. For each of the setting events, the potential
weakly correlated “influencing” events are the events that lie to the past: the four P
events and their logical combinations. There must be no event C associated to the
past that has γ˜i(C) = 1 for at least one value of i, and that also has γ˜i(C) = 0 for
all values of i such that γ˜i(A) = 0, for any setting event A (apart from the trivial
“setting” ∅). We only need show that these conditions do not hold for any “full
specification” of the settings, for example As ∩Bs, As ∩B
c
s and so on. If they do not
hold for these events then they cannot be true of any disjunction of them, as a truth
valuation cannot have γ˜i(A1∪A2) = 0 if it is the case that γ˜i(A1) = 0 and γ˜i(A2) = 0.
21We can imagine a causal chain descending further into the past, but there is no need to model
this. If there were correlations between some of these “initial events” that were associated to
spacelike regions, leaving out their causal antecedents would be more questionable, but we do not
have to address this issue here since all past events are associated to the same region.
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Disjunctions of the full specifications cover all non-trivial logical combinations of the
settings. Let us consider the full specification As ∩ Bs, which is true for the truth
valuations for which 13 ≤ i ≤ 16 in the table and false for 1 ≤ i ≤ 12.
Now let us consider full specifications of the past events, meaning the sixteen
“finest-grained” events such that knowing that one of these events had truth value
1 would imply the truth value of all other past events. These are the events PA0 ∩
PA1 ∩ PB0 ∩ PB1, PA0 ∩ PA1 ∩ PB0 ∩ P
c
B1 and so on. Let us label these events {Fj}
where j runs between one and sixteen (j is used to distinguish this index from the
index i labelling the sixteen truth valuations, which is quite distinct). We will now
show that, for any value of j, γ˜i(Fj) = 0 when 1 ≤ i ≤ 12 implies that γ˜i(Fj) = 0
when 13 ≤ i ≤ 16. Thus, it cannot be true that γ˜i(Fj) = 1 for at least one value of i
and that γ˜i(Fj) = 0 for all values of i such that γ˜i(As ∩ Bs) = 0. In other words, Fj
is not (non-trivially) weakly correlated to As ∩ Bs.
The events {Fj} involve the conjunction of two indefinite events. The truth value
γ˜i(PA0∩PA1∩PB0∩PB1) is the same for i = {4, 8, 12, 16}: because of our assumptions
on the truth value of conjunctions of indefinite events made above, it takes the value
w. The truth value γ˜i(PA0 ∩ PA1 ∩ PB0 ∩ PB1) also holds the same value, zero, for all
other values of i: as can be seen from the table, there are zeros in the columns for
some P events in all other values of i, which makes the conjunction definitely zero. A
similar argument can be made for all fifteen other events in the set {Fj}. The result
is that for all values of j, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, γ˜i(Fj) = γ˜i+4(Fj) = γ˜i+8(Fj) = γ˜i+12(Fj).
Moreover, it follows that this is true also for disjunctions of events in {Fj}, that is,
for all non-trivial past events.
From this, it follows that, for all j, either γ˜i(Fj) = 0 for all values of 0, or it is
non-zero for some i in the range 1 ≤ i ≤ 12. Again, this is also true for disjunctions
of events in {Fj}. This shows that none of the past events are (non-trivially) weakly
correlated to the setting event As ∩ Bs. The same argument can be adapted to the
remaining three “full specification” setting events As∩B
c
s, A
c
s∩Bs and A
c
s∩B
c
s. From
this, it follows that the freedom of settings condition holds.
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